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Intellectual Property Experimentalism By Way Of Competition Law
BY T I M W U 1

C

ompetition law and Intellectual Property have divergent intellectual cultures–the former more pragmatic
and experimentalist; the latter influenced by natural law and vested rights. The US Supreme Court
decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis is an intellectual victory for the former approach, one
that suggests that antitrust law can and should be used to introduce greater scrutiny of the specific consequences
of intellectual property grants.
One day at the Athenaeum club in London, an unnamed attorney said something along these lines:
“We know that the laws only penalize agreements that restrain competition. Given the existence of a valid
patent, the market belongs to the drug manufacturer, and there is, therefore, no possibility of restraining competition.”
“You’re saying generic drug makers and pharmaceutical companies aren’t competitors,” said someone, with
an air of disbelief.
“Of course not,” said the attorney, “because as an owner of a patent, they have been given the market, so
there is no competition.”
“I can’t sit here and listen to this,” said someone else.
THE COMPETITION LAW IS MORE
PR AGMATIC IN ORIENTATION, AND,
BORROWING FROM THE NORMS OF
ECONOMISTS, STRONGLY INTERESTED
IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
LAW’S OPER ATION. MEANWHILE
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
RETAIN A DOMINANT CULTURE
CLOSER TO A NATUR AL LAW RIGHTS
TR ADITION, TAKING THE PRIMARY
DUTY OF LAW AS THE CREATION AND
PROTECTION OF VESTED RIGHTS,
WITH LESS REGARD FOR THE SPECIFIC
EFFECTS OF RIGHTS GR ANTED.

The exchange of words above, one of many heated
exchanges during that day, may seem like nothing
more than a typical clash between those who happen
to take different views of a case. But disagreements
can sometimes reveal something deeper, and what
comes across here is a fundamental intellectual divide
between practitioners in the intellectual property and
competition law fields. While sometimes said to share
“a common purpose of promoting innovation and
consumer welfare,”2 those with any experience in the
two fields know how different the thinking in each can
be. The competition law is more pragmatic in orientation, and, borrowing from the norms of economists,
strongly interested in the consequences of the law’s
operation. Meanwhile the intellectual property laws
retain a dominant culture closer to a natural law rights
tradition, taking the primary duty of law as the creation and protection of vested rights, with less regard for
the specific effects of rights granted.
30
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While I’m hardly the first to write about the distinctive intellectual traditions of the two regimes,3 in
this paper I want to try to take a new look at the intellectual divide, and in particular, how it yields different
approaches to a key issue, namely, how the law reacts to changing conditions and unintended consequences.
I am not neutral party in this debate. I believe that the IP laws in general, and the patent laws in particular,
need to be better attuned to their actual effects on commerce. Stated differently, I think we need a more experimentalist intellectual property regime, that is, one that views the laws as an ongoing project in constant need of
improvement.4 As a practical matter, however, such regime change seems unlikely to emerge organically. One
means for introducing a more error-sensitive intellectual property system is increased use of the competition
laws as an oversight regime.
That’s a task that competition enforcers have already been taking seriously, and the Supreme Court’s 2013
decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis can be read (perhaps generously) as a blessing of such efforts.
The decision effectively approved more than a decade of efforts by the Federal Trade Commission to stop
“pay-for-delay” patent settlements that it considered anticompetitive. At a more general level, it approved of
an ongoing examination of the actual consequences of patents using the antitrust laws, and as such the details
of the decision are less important than its approach. Of course, implicit in the grant of a patent is accepting
anticompetitive consequences, but in Actavis the Court viewed that fact merely as another factor for antitrust
analysis. In other words, one job of the competition laws is improving the patent system and perhaps intellectual property more generally.

I.

EXPERIMENTALISM

Experimentalism is not a word that attorneys use very often. At its most general, the idea of legal experimentalism is to apply the scientific method of hypothesis, experiment, and observation of consequence to challenging
legal and policy problems. It is, as such, closely related to a “pragmatist” legal philosophy.5
John Dewey is usually credited with laying a philosophical foundation for policy experimentalism in his
writings in the 1910s and 1920s. Dewey, whose background was in education, believed that a successful democracy needed the capacity to learn and improve itself. The key to learning, he believed, was the processing
of experiences, or in his words the “reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning
of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.”6
As relevant to the legal system, Dewey thought policy and “proposals for social action” should be subject
to the experimental method. Policy-making, he said, should be a constant process of learning from experience,
rather than relying on rigid or foundational truths. “Policies,” Dewey argued, should be “experimental in the
sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they
entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences.” 7
As understood here we can describe legal experimentalism as comprising three main principles. First, for
the experimentalist, laws are simply instruments meant to achieve some end and useful only to the extent they
do so. A law has no intrinsic value, and its existence should not necessarily count in favor of its retention.
Second, every law should be thought of as an ongoing experiment. That is to say, every enactment, reguVolume 9 | Number 2 | Autumn 2013
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lation or judicial opinion must be seen as that moment’s best guess as to what a rule should be, in light of
imperfect information and human fallibility. Borrowing Dewey’s language, policies should be thought of as a
“working hypothesis, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed.”8 Given the imperfect nature of
law-making, policy should be subject to revision when faced with new information or changed conditions. The
law must also be able to learn and improve itself based on observation of consequences, intended or otherwise.
Third, in service of the first two principles, the relevant institutions should be designed to learn and improve the law through an experimental process. There are, actually, many ways this could be achieved. 9 But
to actually perform something that resembles an experiment, its most important structure is some tolerance
for legal diversity, coupled with a centralized mechanism for evaluating the results of different approaches to
the same problem.

II.

COMPETITION LAW

Over the last few decades, legal regimes that are experimentalist by design have emerged in discrete areas of
regulation, such as mine safety or in the use of drug courts. As Professors Charles Sabel10 and Bill Simon put
it, these are institutions that achieve a “decentralization of operative control with central coordination of the
evaluation of results.”11 But it is also possible for legal experimentalism to arise organically, particularly when
scattered lawmakers confront similar problems repeatedly. Arguably, for example, a form of serial experimentalism
has been going on for centuries within the framework in the common law tradition, where diverse judges work
through cases, continually reassessing old precedent and occasionally discarding rules that no longer work.12
ARGUABLY, FOR EX AMPLE, A FORM OF
SERIAL EXPERIMENTALISM HAS BEEN
GOING ON FOR CENTURIES WITHIN THE
FR AMEWORK IN THE COMMON LAW
TR ADITION, WHERE DIVERSE JUDGES
WORK THROUGH CASES, CONTINUALLY
REASSESSING OLD PRECEDENT AND
OCCASIONALLY DISCARDING RULES
THAT NO LONGER WORK.12
WHILE COMPETITION LAW ISN’T
FORMALLY EXPERIMENTALIST, I
SUGGEST THAT THE COMPETITION
AND ANTITRUST LAWS TEND TOWARD
SUCH INFORMAL EXPERIMENTALISM.

While competition law isn’t formally experimentalist, I suggest that the competition and antitrust laws
tend toward such informal experimentalism. It is, first,
evident that the competition law has long been considered an instrument for achieving goals, not recognizing
abstract rights. The law’s goals are general to a fault:
once upon a time in the United States, “to eliminate
the evil of bigness;”13 in more recent decades, the less
colorful goal of “encourage[ing] competitive markets
to promote consumer welfare.”14 Even if the goals of
the law have evolved, the idea that the law is only really
understood as valuable to the degree it promotes those
goals has not.15 None of this is to say that antitrust
attorneys never get fixed in their views, but that isn’t
usually seen as an attractive trait.

Structurally, over the last several decades, the geographic spread of competition laws has created a natural
experimentalist structure. The exact same legal problem is often faced by the European authorities, the two
American agencies (Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission), and hundreds other national
competition authorities, American states, and individual American judges in private lawsuits. Furthermore, within
the large agencies, individual staff attorneys often have a surprising discretion to begin informal investigations.
32
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That experimentalist structure has been preserved, because, despite the obvious potential for international
conflict, there is no serious movement toward a single, uniform competition law, and there is no global competition law treaty. As Hugh Hollman, Bill Kovacic and Andrew Robertson put it, “complete uniformity is probably
unattainable and undesirable” for it would impede experimentation.16 As we shall see, that’s an attitude sharply
at odds with the position taken in the intellectual property community.
Finally, for more than a century in the United
States, and for decades in Europe and the rest of the
world, the law has undergone ongoing tinkering and
serial experimentation by legislatures, agencies, and
courts. That is true both within regimes and across
them. Consider, for example, the specific history of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which has gone through
various peaks and valleys not unlike a long-running
cardiogram. Based on then-current opinion, the law
has gone from being close to a no-fault deconcentration rule17 to something very close to dead (during
the second Bush administration).18 Or consider that
there have been six versions of the American merger
guidelines since 1968.

THE GLOBAL COMPETITION SYSTEM
ALSO LACKS ANY FORMAL SYSTEM
FOR A CENTR ALIZED ASSESSMENT OF
DIFFERENT APPROACHES. HOWEVER
THERE ARE INFORMAL MECHANISMS
FOR DOING SO, INCLUDING THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK, THE OECD WORKING
GROUP AND OTHER LESS FORMAL
GROUPS THAT SPEND THEIR TIME
ASSESSING BEST PR ACTICES AND,
INFORMALLY, COMPARING RESULTS.

Europe has, if anything, seen greater variation. Consider, for example, the initial years of the European
Commission Merger Regulation focused on the formal distinction between “cooperative” and “concentrative”
joint ventures.19 European merger control has quickly evolved both in application and legislatively. Throughout
the ‘90s the European Commission entertained novel antitrust theories and remedies,20 and by 2004, just 15
years after the regulations were enacted, the ECMR saw substantial reform that, among other things, enabled
the commission to prohibit mergers that “significantly impede effective competition” even if the merger would
not confer dominance, which previously had been the sole standard.21
To be sure, this history of tinkering is not quite the formal, parallel experimentation that Sabel discusses.
A critic might point out that Europeans don’t necessarily feel bound to learn from American failures, and vice
versa. But what creates an experimentalist culture, as opposed to just legal diversity is a sense of continuing
trying to learn from what has succeeded and what has failed. This may be due to the influence of economists
than any other reason, and their fondness for the “natural experiment.”22 Of course, the success or failure of
any law is hard and maybe impossible to measure accurately, which makes this a challenging proposition. Given
the lack of controls and the difficulty of untangling cause and effect, it is difficult to know whether a given
merger policy was more or less successful, or whether a major investigation was just a waste of resources or a
critical turning point for an industry. But nonetheless there is a spirit of learning that is manifested in efforts
to learn from failures, or imitate investigations seen as successful.
The global competition system also lacks any formal system for a centralized assessment of different approaches. However there are informal mechanisms for doing so, including the International Competition
Network, the OECD working group and other less formal groups that spend their time assessing best practices
and, informally, comparing results.
Volume 9 | Number 2 | Autumn 2013
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III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
To say that the copyright, trademark and patent laws do not have an experimentalist spirit might be something
of an understatement. Rather, to describe the laws as an ongoing experiment might easily risk offense.
There is no reason, a priori, that the intellectual property laws could not be subject to an experimentalist
approach.23 The laws have general goals and there are many potential ways to achieve them. To take a minor
example, no one really knows what duration of copyright or patents is optimal. However, there seems at present
to be very little apparent interest among lawmakers for trying different terms in different jurisdictions or for
different subject matters and seeing what happens.
THE DOMINANT CULTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RETAINS
A PERSISTENT LINK AGE WITH
THE NATUR AL LAW TR ADITION,
WHICH RECOGNIZES A NATUR AL
RIGHT IN THE INVENTOR OR
CREATOR, AND THE LANGUAGE OF
PROPERTY, OF WHICH THE PHR ASE
“INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY” IS
JUST THE MOST OBVIOUS SIGN.24

Even though the IP laws are sometimes discussed
and defended in economic terms, one might say that
the influence of economic thought has been partial.
There is, to be sure, much discussion of incentives as
the justification for intellectual property, but a full
application of the scientific method has not generally
been welcome. In fact, proposals by economists to
tinker with obvious defects in the law are more often
met with panic than interest.

Rather, despite the efforts of some scholars, the
dominant culture of intellectual property retains a
persistent linkage with the natural law tradition, which recognizes a natural right in the inventor or creator,
and the language of property, of which the phrase “intellectual property” is just the most obvious sign.24 In
this view, the primary duty of the law is to recognize and protect rights of individuals (or corporate individuals). These could be rights against the government, like the American right against self-incrimination; rights in
contract; or rights in property. The recognition of such rights is less a means to some other goal than the point
of the law itself. What rights should be protected is, moreover, less a matter that depends on circumstance, but
rather an answer that comes from consideration of fundamental truths.
The intellectual culture of the rights tradition has created two important differences with the competition
regime in the face of changing conditions and the evolution of the law.
First, in the face of changing conditions, the logic of a vested right suggested that the priority should be the
protection the right against erosion. Courts must defend the holder of a vested right not just against external
threats, but against subsequent government action that might threaten the value of existing rights. Second, rights
systems generally aspire toward uniformity across jurisdictions. Given a clear idea as to what rights should be
protected, there is, logically, no clear reason for variation between jurisdictions or nations.
We can see the practical implications of both of these tendencies as they have manifested over the last few
decades. For one thing, the reaction to technological change has usually been a fortification of the right rather
than a rethinking of the system.25 Consider, for example, the reaction of the laws to the massive technological
changes over the 1980s and 1990s, when the successive development of personal computers, digitalization tech34
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nologies and the Internet rather obviously changed the assumptions on which both patent and copyright had
long relied. In both the United States and Europe the predominant legal response was to strengthen copyrights
and to expand the subject matter of patent. The merits of such laws are not the subject here; the point was that,
as opposed to reconsidering what would serve the broader purposes of the law under changed conditions, the
challenge was framed as protecting the existing rights against potential erosion.
The goals of uniformity and predictability has had its clearest implications at the international level. Unlike competition law, which varies significantly between OECD nations, over the last several decades all of the
IP laws have become subject to a much stronger and geographically broader web of harmonizing international
agreements, on multinational, regional and bilateral levels. The general aim of these treaties is to homogenize
the world’s IP regimes, reducing or eliminating geographical variation. All of the major laws are the subject of
longstanding global treaties specifying minimum protections (The Berne and Paris conventions), which were
fortified in 1994 by the addition of an intellectual property agreement to the World Trade Organization, and
further strengthened by numerous bilateral treaties since then. And of course the World Trade Organization,
unlike the informal organizations common to competition law, has the power to punish deviations from the
intellectual property treaties with serious trade sanctions.
The pattern can also be observed at the national level. Both in Europe and the United States the last few
decades have witnessed many important measures taken to create uniformity. In the United States, a single
appeals court, the Federal Circuit, has heard the nation’s appeals in patent cases since 1982 in an effort to
bring greater uniformity to the patent law. Though proposals for constructing a uniform patent court akin to
the Federal Circuit in the European Union have been unsuccessful so far,26 the European Patent Convention,
founded in 1973, provides a common application for the prosecution of patents in each of the member states. 27
In short, stronger protection of uniform rights has been the clear trajectory of the intellectual property laws
over the last few decades. That tendency is sharply at odds with the predispositions of the competition laws.
The dichotomy I am suggesting here is, of course, not absolute. In certain areas of the competition law,
one can sense the influence of a vested rights theory, in, for example, the resistance to breakups of dominant
firms, even if the economic case for doing so might be quite strong. And there are areas in IP law, like the
American fair use doctrine (a judicial and scholarly favorite), which have, in fact, served as important outlets
for judicial tinkering in the face of changing conditions. For example the famous Sony decision, blessing the
VCR, broke with prevalent copyright doctrine, arguably as a reaction to perceived technological necessity.28
Similarly, following a decade of bad press, Congress, the courts, and the American Patent Office have begun to
make adjustments with American patent law. An example is the new post-grant review process, which includes
a particular provision targeted at business method patents.
Nonetheless it would be hard to describe the intellectual culture of either the intellectual property laws as
truly committed to experimental improvement of the law. It would be even harder to describe competition law
as devoted to the protection of fundamental rights. We are left with a divergence in intellectual cultures with
broad implications for just about every advanced economy in the world.
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NONETHELESS IT WOULD BE HARD
TO DESCRIBE THE INTELLECTUAL
CULTURE OF EITHER THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS AS
TRULY COMMITTED TO EXPERIMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW. IT WOULD
BE EVEN HARDER TO DESCRIBE
COMPETITION LAW AS DEVOTED TO
THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS. WE ARE LEFT WITH A
DIVERGENCE IN INTELLECTUAL
CULTURES WITH BROAD IMPLICATIONS
FOR JUST ABOUT EVERY ADVANCED
ECONOMY IN THE WORLD.

IV. USING ANTITRUST FOR
PATENT EXPERIMENTALISM
AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
I believe there is a need for a more experimentalist
approach to the intellectual property laws, and particularly to the patent laws. The law, I believe, needs better
mechanisms not simply to celebrate its successes, but
to correct its errors, both specific and general. One way
this might be achieved is to act within the structure and
institutions of the laws themselves; as just discussed,
this is a project underway in certain respects. But the
other path is to rely on the competition laws as a kind
of oversight and adjustment mechanism for the intellectual property laws.

I am, of course, hardly the first to advocate this position, and it is clear that the world’s major competition agencies already view part of their job as handling patents’ unexpected consequences. Yet that role is not
universally accepted for the ideological reasons just suggested. When a competition agency takes a look at how
a patent or copyright is actually being used, it raises the question of what degree the government can, having
given out rights, later declare that it has made a mistake and limit usage based on new evidence.29 That was
precisely the question presented in the American Supreme Court’s 2013 patent-antitrust decision, Federal Trade
Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Court’s first case at the intersection of the two laws in quite some time.30
At issue in the case was a particular practice of brand-name pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and their
generic rivals with respect to patented drugs. In the late 1990s the Commission began investigating and challenging certain settlements between patent-holders and would-be generic entrants. The Commission suspected
that generics and brand-name manufacturers were settling patent infringement cases in a way that effectively
split patent profits at the expense of the public.
The facts of the particular case considered by the Supreme Court make clearer how this might happen.
The case centered on AndroGel, a testosterone replacement therapy manufactured by Solvay, a relatively large
drug company. In 2003, two other drug makers sought to introduce generic versions of the drug. While AndroGel is protected by a patent that expires in 2021, the generics challenged the patent as invalid, and also not
infringed upon by the proposed generic products. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, such challenges are a form
of infringement, and Solvay sued.
Three years later the parties settled, agreeing to make generic AndroGel unavailable until 2015. Of course,
the drug would have reached the public in 2006 or 2007 if the patent had been found invalid or not infringed.
Meanwhile, Solvay made large payments to the generic manufacturers (which it claimed were unrelated). As
such, the Federal Trade Commission alleged the settlement was a payment for a delayed arrival of a generic
drug, or a “pay-for-delay” deal.
36
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From the view of strict vested rights approach, it is obvious that such settlements ought not to be challengeable under the antitrust or other laws, for several reasons. The patent grant defines a right for a private citizen
that is his with which to do whatever he wants. The THE ENTIRE OPINION IS CAPTURED BY
idea of government examining, ex poste, the usage of ONE, EARLY LINE: “[R]EVERSE PAYMENT
rights already granted contradicts the idea of a right
SETTLEMENTS CAN … SOME TIMES
that has vested. Moreover, even if we might concede
VIOLATE THE ANTITRUST LAWS.” THE
that the particular usage of the right in question is
unattractive, the idea of selectively examining such WORD “SOMETIMES” IS VERY DEAR
rights ex poste threatens the certainty and clarity prized TO THE COMPETITION LAW AND
THE PR AGMATIST/EXPERIMENTALIST
by the system as a whole.
METHOD. IT SUGGESTS UNCERTAINTY
This is what Chief Justice Roberts meant when he
AND A LACK OF FIXED TRUTHS,
wrote, in dissent, that a patent right creates a “zone
THAT EVERYTHING WILL TURN
within which the patent holder may operate without
facing antitrust liability.” Once assigned, in this vision ON PARTICULARIZED ASSESSMENT
the right is supreme within the zone defined by its OF FACTS AND CONSEQUENCES.
claims. For the Chief Justice, so long as the patent holder had not left the scope of his assigned right, the case
was over. As he put it, in a line that captures this notion, there was “no reason adjudicate questions of patent
law under antitrust principles.”
To the Federal Trade Commission’s lawyers, its Commissioners and a majority of the Supreme Court, at least
some of these so-called settlements were really just agreements to split the proceeds of a dubious monopoly at
the consumer’s expense, and as such a specific failure of the patent system in need of correction. More broadly,
since such settlements are not uncommon, they were, as a class, a defect in the system that should be fixed.
That framing found a receptive audience in Justice Breyer, the majority author, who among American judges
is one of the most obvious in viewing the intellectual property law as an experiment, and a rather dubious one
at that. In fact, Breyer’s previous writings represent some of the few pragmatist writings on intellectual property to emerge from the Supreme Court. He dissented in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a copyright case that examined a
legislative effort to lengthen the copyright term, retroactively, in light of purportedly changing conditions.31 It
is hard to see how a retroactive term extension promotes any new authorship, and so Breyer declared that the
law’s “practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of Science.”
As a professor, Breyer was less restrained. In 1970 he wrote The Uneasy Case for Copyright, a lengthy piece
that examined copyright and concluded that the law, if perhaps useful once, was no longer really necessary
to ensure the production of creative works, and should therefore probably be done away with.32 Both of these
works reveal a very different approach to legal change than that demanded by a rights-based model. The law
is an instrument; we should examine its content in light of its claimed goals and, if current conditions suggest
the law is valueless, so be it. But until 2013, Breyer had not yet had a chance to write at length on the patentantitrust intersection.33
The entire opinion is captured by one, early line: “[R]everse payment settlements can … sometimes violate
the antitrust laws.” The word “sometimes” is very dear to the competition law and the pragmatist/experimentalist
method. It suggests uncertainty and a lack of fixed truths, that everything will turn on particularized assessment
Volume 9 | Number 2 | Autumn 2013

37

of facts and consequences. Breyer’s opinion is at pains to emphasize the specific contingencies that could create
anticompetitive consequences, as shown by the following passage with an astonishing string of contingencies
(seven, by my count) that, in the right combination, may be more important than encouraging settlements.
[A] reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a payment may be unable to explain and to justify it;
such a firm or individual may well possess market power derived from the patent; a court, by
examining the size of the payment, may well be able to assess its likely anticompetitive effects
along with its potential justifications without litigating the validity of the patent; and parties
may well find ways to settle patent disputes without the use of reverse payments.34
Yet, by far the most significant thing about the opinion is not its use of semi-colons but rather the implication that the antitrust regime sits in a position
IN THE STRONGEST READING OF
of supreme oversight over the patent laws.35 Breyer’s
THE OPINION, PATENT POLICY
approach makes clear that, potentially, any anticomIS REDUCED TO SIMPLY ONE petitive consequence thrown off by the patent system
MORE FACTOR FOR ANTITRUST could be subject to challenge. To be sure, a patent gives
ANALYSIS, WHICH IS EFFECTIVELY its owner some immunity to antitrust. But “patent and
MADE THE UBER-POLICY.…YOU antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the
MAY OWN A PATENT, IT SAYS, BUT ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently anti36
NONETHELESS, THE COMPETITIONS trust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”
LAW WILL ALWAYS BE WATCHING.

In the strongest reading of the opinion, patent
policy is reduced to simply one more factor for antitrust analysis, which is effectively made the uber-policy. That’s
implied when Breyer says courts should determine liability by “considering traditional antitrust factors such as
likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potential offsetting legal considerations
present in the circumstances, such as here those related to patents.”37 For adherents to a rights model, it must
be something to see a property right reduced to merely one of many “potential offsetting legal considerations
present in the circumstances.”
What we have, ultimately, is a Supreme Court blessing for the use of the competition laws to examine potential excesses of the current patent regime. As such, it represents a powerful victory for a method that uses the
antitrust laws to improve the functioning of the patent system, not from within the law itself, but by external
measurement of the law’s consequences for the economy. You may own a patent, it says, but nonetheless, the
competitions law will always be watching.
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